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Commonly used frictional models of the labor market imply that changes in frictions have large effects
on steady state employment and unemployment. We use a model that features both frictions and an
operative labor supply margin to examine the robustness of this feature to the inclusion of a empirically
reasonable labor supply channel. The response of unemployment to changes in frictions is similar
in both models. But the labor supply response present in our model greatly attenuates the effects of
frictions on steady state employment relative to the simplest matching model, and two common extensions.
We also find that the presence of empirically plausible frictions has virtually no impact on the response
of aggregate employment to taxes.
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Two frameworks dominate analyses of aggregate employment—frictionless models that follow
in the tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1982), and frictional models in the tradition of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). While frictionless models necessarily imply that changes
in employment entirely reﬂect changes in desired labor supply (i.e., choice), the simplest
speciﬁcations of frictional models imply that changes in employment entirely reﬂect changes
in the probability of receiving an oﬀer (i.e., chance). It seems clear that both choice and
chance inﬂuence individual employment outcomes in reality; that is, at any point in time
some individuals are not employed by choice, while others are not employed by chance.
There is good reason to believe that these two features could have interesting interactions, in
that the presence of frictions may attenuate the labor supply responses in frictionless models,
while the presence of an operative labor supply margin might similarly attenuate the eﬀects
of frictions. In this paper we assess the relative importance of these two forces in shaping
aggregate steady state employment.
We carry out this analysis in the model of Krusell et al (2009). That paper built an
empirically reasonable model that features both frictions and an operative labor supply mar-
gin. The claim to being empirically reasonable was based on the model’s ability to capture
the key features of the ﬂows of workers across all three labor market states: employment,
unemployment and out of the labor force.
We use this model to ask two simple questions about the forces that inﬂuence steady
2state employment and unemployment. The ﬁrst question is how changes in frictions aﬀect
aggregate steady state outcomes. In the simplest matching model, the level of frictions
(captured by both the oﬀer arrival rate and the separation rate) critically aﬀects the level
of both aggregate employment and unemployment. We assess the extent to which this is
altered when one embeds the frictional model in a context where individuals also solve a
nondegenerate labor supply problem. Intuitively, if employment opportunities are harder
to come by (or jobs do not last very long), individuals can adjust lifetime labor supply by
extending the length of employment spells when employed, or by accepting more employment
opportunities when not employed. In our calibrated model we ﬁnd that the increase in
unemployment is very similar to that implied by a simple matching model. In contrast, we
ﬁnd that labor supply responses greatly attenuate the direct eﬀect of frictions on employment.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a decrease in the arrival rate of employment opportunities leads to
a large increase in the unemployment rate but only a small decrease in the employment rate.
We conclude that while the role of frictions for steady state aggregate unemployment seems
robust to adding a nondegenerate labor supply decision, the impact of frictions on steady
state employment is probably signiﬁcantly overstated in simple matching models. We show
that this same result holds even in versions of the matching model in which match formation
and match termination decisions are introduced.
Second, we use our model to assess the eﬀects of increases in labor taxes used to fund
lump-sum transfers. This question, recently examined in a frictionless model by Prescott
3(2004), seems a simple and sharp example of how an operative labor supply margin inﬂuences
steady state employment. We ask how these eﬀects are altered by the presence of reasonable
frictions. We ﬁnd that the employment eﬀects are eﬀectively unchanged by the presence of
frictions. This result holds not only for tax increases but also tax decreases, which is perhaps
more interesting since it is more likely that frictions will interfere with the desire to increase
the fraction of time spent in employment.1 We conclude that frictions do not seem to be
of ﬁrst order importance in the determination of steady state employment. Interestingly, in
our model with frictions, higher taxes lead to both higher unemployment and higher non-
participation, even holding the level of frictions constant. So, although the aggregate eﬀects
on employment in our model are eﬀectively those found in the frictionless version of the
model, the analysis shows that this does not imply that there are not also eﬀects on both
the level and nature of unemployment.
There is one important qualiﬁcation regarding the above results. A key feature of the
calibrated model of Krusell et al (2009) is that the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is
continuous. It turns out that this assumption is potentially very important for our results
regarding frictions and employment. In particular, we show that one can calibrate a model
in which there are only two values for the idiosyncratic shocks, and do a reasonable job of
matching the ﬂow data, but with very diﬀerent results than those mentioned above. Speciﬁ-
cally, in such a model it is possible that increases in frictions have equally large (but opposite)
1A similar result was found in Krusell et al (2008), but the calibrated model in that paper was not consistent
with worker ﬂows.
4eﬀects on employment and unemployment, and that taxes have no eﬀect on employment. Key
to these results is that the calibration is carried out so as to provide no scope for individuals
to marginally adjust the amount of time that they spend in employment. Moreover, in such
a model there is no scope for aggregate factors to inﬂuence participation rates. While this
type of speciﬁcation does deliver very diﬀerent answers to the questions that we answer, we
conclude that it does not seem to ﬁt well with other observations.
Our paper is related to many papers in the literature. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996)
were the ﬁrst to introduce frictions into an otherwise standard version of the growth model. A
key feature of these models is that employment is completely determined by frictions, just as
in simple frictional models. The model in Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) is closer to ours, since
it features both a standard labor-leisure choice and frictions, but it cannot be calibrated to
match worker ﬂows since worker ﬂows are indeterminate in their equilibrium. Moreover, they
do not ask the question of how changes in frictions aﬀect steady state outcomes. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2006, 2008) consider models that feature indivisible labor and frictions, but
do not consider the impact of frictions on aggregate employment. Low et al (2008) consider
a model with frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision. They consider a richer
model of frictions and income support programs, but their analysis is partial equilibrium and
they address very diﬀerent issues than we do.
An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes the
calibration of the model and presents the implications of the calibrated model for labor mar-
5ket ﬂows. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of changes in frictions on steady state outcomes
in a simple matching model, while Section 5 considers the same issue in some extensions
of this model. Section 6 presents the results for analyzing tax and transfer programs. Sec-
tion 7 discusses robustness issues regarding the nature of idiosyncratic shocks and Section 8
concludes.
2M o d e l
The economy is identical to that in Krusell et al (2009).2 The economy is populated by a
continuum of workers with total mass equal to one. All workers have identical preferences




where ct ≥ 0 is consumption in period t, et ∈ {0,1} is time devoted to work in period t,
0 <β<1 is the discount factor and α>0 is the disutility of work. Individuals are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks that aﬀect the static payoﬀs of work relative to not working. While
many shocks may have this property, e.g., shocks to market opportunities, shocks to home
production opportunities, health shocks, family shocks, preference shocks etc..., we represent
the net eﬀect of all of these shocks as a single shock, and model it as a shock to the return
to market work. In particular, letting st denote the quantity of labor services that they
2Several papers have recently analyzed labor supply in models with idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete
markets, including Floden and Linde (2001), Domeij and Floden (2006), Pijoan-Mas (2006), and Chang and
Kim (2006, 2007). Relative to these papers the distinguishing feature of our model is the presence of frictions.
6contribute if working, we assume an AR(1) stochastic process in logs:
logst+1 = ρlogst + εt+1
where the innovation εt is a mean zero normally distributed random variable with standard
deviation σε.T h i sp r o c e s si st h es a m ef o ra l lworkers, but realizations are iid across workers.
We formulate equilibrium recursively and focus solely on the steady state equilibrium.
In each period there are markets for output, capital services and labor services, but there
are no insurance markets, so individuals will (potentially) accumulate assets to self-insure.
We normalize the price of output to equal one in all periods, and let r and w denote steady
state rental rates for a unit of capital and a unit of labor services, respectively. If a worker
with productivity s chooses to work then he or she would contribute s units of labor services
and therefore earn ws in labor income. We assume that individual capital holdings must
be nonnegative, or equivalently, that individuals are not allowed to borrow. There is a
government that taxes labor income at constant rate τ and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance
a lump-sum transfer payment T subject to a period-by-period balanced budget constraint.
In steady state, the period budget equation for an individual with kt units of capital and
productivity st is given by:
ct + kt+1 = rkt +( 1− τ)wstet +( 1− δ)kt + T.











Output can be used either as consumption or investment, and capital depreciates at rate δ.
Frictions in the labor market are captured by two parameters: λw and σ, where λw is the
employment opportunity arrival rate and σ is the employment separation rate. Speciﬁcally,
we assume there are two islands which we label as the production island and the leisure
island. At the end of period t − 1 an individual is either on the production island or the
leisure island, depending upon whether they worked during the period. At the beginning of
period t each individual will observe the realizations of several shocks. First, each worker
receives a new realization for the value of their idiosyncratic productivity shock. Second,
each individual on the production island observes the realization of an iid separation shock:
with probability σ the individual is relocated to the leisure island. Third, each individual
on the leisure island, including those that have been relocated on account of the separation
shock, observes the realization of an iid employment opportunity shock: with probability λw
an individual is relocated to the production island. In terms of connecting our model with
the literature it is intuitive to think of σ as the exogenous job separation rate, and λw as the
exogenous job arrival rate. Once the shocks have been realized, individuals make their labor
supply and consumption decisions, though only workers with an employment opportunity
can choose e equal to 1. An individual on the production island who chooses not to work
8will then be relocated to the leisure island at the end of period t and will therefore not have
the opportunity to return to the production island until receiving a favorable employment
opportunity shock.
While it is not necessary to follow the results in subsequent sections, for completeness we
formally present the decision problems solved by individuals in the steady state equilibrium.
An individual’s state consists of his or her location at the time that the labor supply decision
needs to be made, the level of asset holdings, and productivity. Let W(k,s) be the maximum
value for an individual who works and N(k,s) be the maximum value for an individual who
does not work given that he or she has productivity s and capital holdings k.D e ﬁne V (k,s)
by:
V (k,s)=m a x {W(k,s),N(k,s)}.
The Bellman equations for W and N are given by:
W(k,s)=m a x
c,k0 {log(c) − α + βEs0[(1 − σ + σλw)V (k0,s 0)+σ(1 − λw)N(k0,s 0)]}
s.t. c + k0 = rk +( 1− τ)ws+( 1− δ)k + T
c ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0
and
N(k,s)=m a x
c,k0 {log(c)+βEs0[λwV (k0,s 0)+( 1− λw)N(k0,s 0)]}
9s.t. c + k0 = rk +( 1− δ)k + T
c ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0
Let μ(k,s,l) denote the measure of individuals over individual states after all of the idiosyn-
cratic shocks have been realized and before any decisions have been taken, where l indexes
location and can take on the two values 0 and 1,w i t hl =1indicating the production island.
T h e r ea r et h r e ed e c i s i o nr u l e s :o n ef o rc,o n ef o rk0, and one for e (which can only take on
the values of 0 or 1).
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model as in Krusell et al (2009), and so refer the reader to that paper for more
a more detailed analysis and discussion of the calibration. A key aspect of the calibration
procedure is to choose parameters so that the distribution of workers across states and the
ﬂows of workers between states are similar to those in the US economy. In what follows we
will use E to denote the employment state, U to denote the unemployment state, and N to
denote the not in the labor force state. A necessary step is to take a stand on how to allocate
the nonemployed workers in the model between the unemployed and out of the labor force
states. As in Krusell et al (2009) we call a worker in the model unemployed if they did not
work in period t but would have preferred to work if they had the opportunity. In order to
10have a consistent deﬁnition in the model and the data, we use this same criterion to deﬁne
unemployed workers in the data. Since our deﬁnition is somewhat broader than that used by
the BLS, our unemployment rate is somewhat larger (8.3% versus 5.1%) and we also need to
compute ﬂows for our notion of unemployment. As a practical matter it turns out that this
adjustment has very little eﬀect on the ﬂows.
Having described how we will measure ﬂows across states in the data and the model,
we now consider how to calibrate the model’s parameters. The model has nine parameters
that need to be assigned: preference parameters β and α, production parameters θ and δ,
idiosyncratic shock parameters ρ and σe, frictional parameters σ and λw,a n dt h et a xr a t eτ.
The length of a period is set to one month. Because our model is a variation of the standard
growth model, we can choose some of these parameter values using the same procedure that is
typically used to calibrate versions of the growth model. The features of incomplete markets
and uncertainty implies that we cannot derive analytic expressions for the steady state, and
so cannot isolate the connection between certain parameters and target values. Nonetheless,
it is still useful and intuitive to associate particular targets and parameter values. Speciﬁcally,
given values for λw, σ, ρ,a n dσε,w ec h o o s eθ = .3 to target a capital share of .3, δ to achieve
an investment to output ratio equal to .2, the discount factor β to target an annual real
rate of return on capital equal to 4%. The other preference parameter α, which captures the
disutility of working, is set so that the steady state value of employment is equal to .632.
This is the value of the employment to population ratio for the population aged 16 and older
11for the period 1994 − 2007.3
The tax rate is set at τ = .30. Following the work of Mendoza et al (1994) there are
several papers which produce estimates of the average eﬀective tax rate on labor income
across countries. Examples include Prescott (2004) and McDaniel (2006). There are minor
variations in methods across these studies, which do produce some small diﬀerences in the
estimates, and the value .30 is chosen as representative of these estimates.4
It remains to choose values for the λw, σ, ρ and σε.W e c h o o s e λw so that the steady
state unemployment rate in our model (i.e., U/(E+U))i se q u a lt o.083, which is the average
value for our notion of the unemployment rate in the US data for the period 1994 − 2007.
We choose σ to target the ﬂow rate from employment to unemployment.
Krusell et al (2009) showed that the ability of the model to account for the ﬂows between
states remains relatively constant for a wide range of values of ρ and σε. What mattered most
was that ρ was reasonably persistent (at least .5), but not too close to being a unit root (say
less than .97), and that σε was not too small. In their benchmark calibration they assumed
ρ = .92 and σε = .21 expressed on an annual basis. These values correspond to one set of
estimates of idiosyncratic wage shocks for prime-aged working males, as reported in Floden
and Linde (2001). A key issue for our quantitative exercises is the extent to which diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the shock process inﬂuence our results, despite having relatively little impact
3We calibrate to values for the period 1994-2007 because this is the period for which we have consistent
measures of labor market ﬂows.
4Note that Prescott (2004) makes an adjustment to the average labor tax rate to arrive at a marginal tax
rate that is roughly 40%. For purposes of computing the eﬀect of changes in taxes this adjustment plays no
role.
12on worker ﬂows. It turns out that the results are relatively unaﬀected by considering diﬀerent
calibrated values for ρ and σε, given that in each case we recalibrate the remaining parameters
to continue to hit the same targets. As a result, we will only present results for this one set
of values for ρ and σε.
Table 1 shows our calibrated parameter values.
Table 1
Benchmark Calibrated Parameter Values
θδ βαρ σ e λw στ
.30 .0067 .9967 .547 .9931 .1017 .436 .039 .30
The labor market ﬂows in our calibrated model and the data are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2
Flows in the Model and Data
Adjusted US 1994-2007 Model
FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN
E 0.960 0.021 0.018 E 0.947 0.021 0.032
U 0.248 0.517 0.235 U 0.407 0.527 0.066
N 0.036 0.045 0.919 N 0.034 0.044 0.922
A major discrepancy has to do with the ﬂow of workers from U to N. As discussed in
Krusell et al (2009), this discrepancy is much less if we consider male workers aged 21-65
instead of the whole population. Additionally, assuming some survey response error that
causes spurious transitions between N and U also removes much of the discrepancy.5 While
there is room for additional improvements relative to this simple model, we feel that the
match is suﬃciently close to justify using this model to revisit some basic questions about
the forces that shape steady state employment and unemployment.
5Survey response error also lowers the measured ﬂow rate from U to E s i n c es o m eo ft h ep e o p l ec o u n t e d
in U are actually in N and therefore transition to E with much lower probability,
13Even accounting for survey response error as noted above, the ﬂow rate from U to E is
somewhat high relative to the data. If one is concerned about the calibrated level of frictions
being reasonable, this might be viewed as an important target. Krusell et al (2009) also
presents an alternative calibration in which the ﬂow rate from U to E is targeted instead
of the stock of U. While we do not report any results for this alternative calibration, we
note here that all of the results presented below are eﬀectively identical for this alternative
calibration.
4 Frictions and the Steady State I: A Benchmark Comparison
One of the deﬁning features of the Pissarides matching model and its many variants is that the
level of frictions play a key role in determining not only the level of aggregate unemployment
but also in determining the level of aggregate employment.6 Intuitively, labor supply con-
siderations will attenuate the impact of changes in frictions on aggregate employment. The
reason for this is that if it becomes harder to ﬁnd employment opportunities, then workers
will be more willing to continue with a job opportunity once they ﬁnd it, or decide to accept
employment at lower productivities. The goal of this section is to explore the quantitative
importance of these eﬀects in our model relative to standard frictional models.
We begin by exploring the impact of exogenous changes in the level of λw,t h a ti s ,w e
evaluate the impact on the steady state of an exogenous change in the level of frictions. We
are primarily interested in the extent to which the responses in our model are diﬀerent than
6See Pissarides (2000) for a variety of models that have this property.
14those that would emerge in a benchmark version of the Pissarides matching model. In the
simplest Pissarides model, the match separation rate is exogenous, but the job oﬀer arrival
rate is endogenously determined by the volume of vacancy posting. In this model all job
oﬀers are accepted, so the job oﬀer arrival rate is also the probability that an unemployed
worker becomes employed. If the match separation rate is σ a n dt h ej o bo ﬀer arrival rate is
λw, and we assume that individuals can begin to work in the same period as receiving a job
oﬀer, then the law of motion for the unemployment rate is:
ut+1 =( 1− λw)ut + σ(1 − λw)(1 − ut).
It follows that the steady state employment rate is given by:
¯ u =
σ(1 − λw)
λw + σ(1 − λw)
.
We set σ = .039 as in our benchmark calibration, and then set λw so that the steady
state unemployment rate is equal to .083, which was the same target that we matched in
our calibration. The implied value of λw is .301. We will then consider equal proportional
changes in the value of λw in the two models, i.e., we increase or decrease λw by the same
percentage in the two models. Although the value of λw is endogenously determined in the
Pissarides model, we do not model the source of this change. Rather, we focus simply on the
consequences of such a change for employment and unemployment.
Table 3 shows the eﬀects for the aggregate employment to population ratio (E/P)a n d
the unemployment rate in the two models, for our benchmark calibration. We emphasize
15that the predictions of our model are very similar for diﬀerent values of ρ and σε,a n df o r
the alternative calibration procedure in which λw is targeted to match the E to U ﬂow. In
the interest of space we only report results for the benchmark calibration.
Table 3
Eﬀect of λw on Employment and Unemployment Rates
Our model Pissarides model
E/P U/(U + E) E/P U/(U + E)
λw =0 .66 3 .5% 4.6% λw =0 .414 94.8% 5.2%
λw = .436 63.2% 8.3% λw =0 .301 91.7% 8.3%
λw =0 .46 3 .0% 9.3% λw =0 .276 90.7% 9.3%
λw =0 .26 1 .0% 18.8% λw =0 .138 80.4% 19.6%
In reading this table each row represents the same percentage change in λw relative to
the two benchmark calibrations, which by construction each have the same unemployment
rate. A striking result emerges. If one looks at the responses of unemployment, one observes
that the eﬀects are very similar across the two diﬀerent models. Moreover, the eﬀects are
large—when λw is decreased from the benchmark setting to the lowest value in the table, the
unemployment rate roughly triples in both cases. But when one looks at the employment
rate responses one sees dramatic diﬀerences. In the Pissarides model, changes in the un-
employment rate and changes in the employment rate are necessarily mirror images of each
other since by construction all workers are in the labor force. Hence, the Pissarides model
also predicts large employment responses as a result of changes in λw. In sharp contrast,
our model predicts very small changes in employment rates. The change in the employment
rate in our model is only about one-sixth as large as the change in the Pissarides model. For
example, when moving from the benchmark speciﬁcation to the lowest value of λw in the
table, the employment rate decreases by more than 10 percentage points in the Pissarides
16model but only by about 2 percentage points in our model.
T os e ew h yt h et w om o d e l sg i v es u c hd i ﬀerent employment responses it is instructive to
examine the durations of employment and unemployment spells.
Table 4
Eﬀect of λw on Spell Durations
Our model Pissarides model
EU EU
λw =0 .61 9 .91 .6 λw =0 .414 43.82 .4
λw = .436 18.72 .1 λw =0 .301 36.73 .3
λw =0 .41 8 .72 .3 λw =0 .276 35.43 .6
λw =0 .22 0 .04 .3 λw =0 .138 29.77 .2
In both models a decrease in λw leads to an increase in the duration of unemployment, and
the proportional changes are very similar in the two models. But the changes in employment
durations are actually opposite in the two models. In the Pissarides model a decrease in
λw leads to a decrease in the duration of employment spells. The reason for this is that
decreases in λw make it less likely that a separated worker ﬁnds a new job during the initial
period of the separation, thereby preserving the employment spell. If we had instead assumed
that workers necessarily spend one period out of employment following a separation, then we
would have found that the duration of employment spells is constant. In contrast to either
of these outcomes, in our model the duration of employment spells increases signiﬁcantly in
response to decreases in λw. In moving from the benchmark value of λw to the lowest value
in the table, the duration of employment in our model increases by more than one third.
It is instructive to examine how the distribution of employment across productivity states
is inﬂuenced by changes in λw. Figure 1 plots the mass of employment at each productivity
level in the support of the distribution for various values of λw,a sw e l la st h em a s so fw o r k e r s


















Figure 1: Distribution of Employment by Productivity
with each productivity level.
As frictions increase, some mass from the employment distribution is shifted from the right
tail to the left tail. Intuitively, if there are no frictions, then all workers with suﬃciently high
productivity will work, but in the presence of frictions, some of these workers are not able
to work because they do not have an employment opportunity. But what is interesting to
note is that even for a very large change in frictions, the increase in mass at the bottom of
the productivity distribution is quite small, and it remains true that the lowest productivity
workers do not work at all.7
We can also repeat the above analysis to examine how the two diﬀerent models respond
to exogenous changes in σ, the separation shock. Proceeding as above, Table 5 presents the
7It is important to keep in mind that our model includes a government transfer program, so that individuals
do receive some income even when not working.
18eﬀects on employment and unemployment.8
Table 5
Eﬀect of σ on Employment and Unemployment Rates
Our model Pissarides model
E/P U/(U + E) E/P U/(U + E)
σ =0 .02 63.7% 6.3% 95.6% 4.4%
σ = .039 63.2% 8.3% 91.7% 8.3%
σ =0 .04 63.2% 8.4% 91.5% 8.5%
σ =0 .06 62.6% 10.4% 87.8% 12.2%
Changes in unemployment rates in response to changes in σ are about one half as large in
our model as in the Pissarides model. And the employment response is only about one-tenth
as large in our model as in the Pissarides model. Table 6 shows that the reason for the large
diﬀerences in employment rate responses has to do with a labor supply eﬀect.
Table 6
Eﬀect of σ on Spell Durations
Our model Pissarides model
EU E U
σ =0 .02 23.12 .17 1 .53 .3
σ = .039 18.72 .13 6 .73 .3
σ =0 .04 18.62 .13 5 .83 .3
σ =0 .06 15.62 .12 3 .83 .3
In the Pissarides model, changes in σ lead mechanically to changes in employment dura-
tion. The implication is that the large changes in σ are associated with large and proportional
changes in employment duration. In contrast, in our model, decreases in σ lead to what in
comparison are only very moderate increases in employment duration. The reason is due
to the response in labor supply. When σ is high, it is less likely that an individual has an
employment opportunity in any given period, and as a result they respond by being willing
8Because the values of σ a r et h es a m ei nt h et w ob e n c h m a r ke c o n o mies we now consider equal changes in
the two economies.
19to work at lower productivity levels. This in turn implies less "voluntary" separations. But
when σ decreases, the reverse is true, and individuals become choosier about when to work,
leading to more voluntary separations.
5 Frictions and the Steady State II: Extensions
One of the key ﬁndings in the previous section was that labor supply responses greatly
attenuate the eﬀect of frictions on steady state employment. Readers familiar with the
matching literature might reasonably argue that this result is heavily inﬂuenced by our choice
of the benchmark model. In particular, a key feature of the benchmark model is that given
the level of frictions, there are no other margins of adjustment that work to at least partially
oﬀset the eﬀect of frictions. But while this is a property of the benchmark model, simple and
popular extensions of this model, including those in Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), do include an additional choice margin that might play the same role as
the labor supply channel in our model.
In Pissarides (1985), when a meeting between a worker and a ﬁrm occurs, the pair receives
a random draw of a permanent match quality. The optimal decision about whether to form
a match is characterized by a reservation rule, i.e., proceed with forming the match if the
draw for match quality is above some threshold. In this setting, steady state employment
will depend on both the level of frictions and the reservation value. Intuitively, if frictions
become more severe, workers will become less choosy about which matches to form, thereby
giving rise to a force that can at least partially oﬀset the direct eﬀect of more severe frictions.
20Similarly, in Mortensen and Pissarides, all matches start at the same high level for match
quality, but this quality subsequently evolves stochastically. In this setting a key decision is
when to terminate a match, which under fairly standard conditions will again be characterized
by a reservation rule. In this setting an increase in frictions can lead to a lower reservation
value, implying that match terminations will decrease. Once again, this creates an opposing
eﬀect on steady state employment relative to the direct eﬀect.
The question that we ask in this section is whether our ﬁnding about the quantitative
importance of the labor supply channel for employment responses remains when we compare
our model with either of these extensions. We note at the outset that although one naturally
expects these extensions to lessen the diﬀerence between our model and the benchmark
Pissarides model, there is good reason to think that a signiﬁcant diﬀerence will remain. This
is due to the speciﬁcation of linear utility in the matching literature. In a standard model
of labor supply, including the model we are using in this paper, when a worker decreases the
fraction of life spent in employment, average consumption decreases, which in turn increases
the marginal utility of consumption and creates an incentive for the individual to increase the
fraction of time spent in employment. In contrast, a decrease in average consumption in a
model with linear utility does not increase the marginal utility of consumption, and therefore
does not contain this force leading to higher employment.
In fact, we will ﬁnd that our labor supply channel is a substantially more powerful oﬀ-
setting force than the margins present in either of these extensions. We conclude that even
21these extended versions of the basic matching model imply much larger eﬀects of frictions on
steady state employment than does our model. We proceed to describe in more detail each
of the two extensions described above.
5.1 Extension 1: Adding a Match Formation Decision
In this subsection we analyze an extension to incorporate the match. In the spirit of our
earlier calculation, we consider a continuum of workers, each of whom solves the same decision




where ct is consumption in period t,a n dht ∈ {0,1} is time devoted to work. If the individual
begins period t not employed, then he or she will receive a job oﬀer with probability λw.
Conditional on receiving a job oﬀer, the wage associated with this oﬀer is a random draw
from the distribution with cdf F(w). The wage associated with this job will remain ﬁxed for
the duration of the match. If the worker decides to accept the oﬀer, he or she will begin the
j o bi nt h es a m ep e r i o da st h eo ﬀer was made. As in our earlier models, any match that existed
in period t−1 ends with probability σ at the beginning of period t. In this case the individual
is in the same situation as someone who began the period unemployed. Consumption in each
period is equal to labor earnings. Letting V (w) be the value of employment at wage w and
U be the value of being unemployed, the Bellman equations are:
V (w)=w − b + β[(1 − σ)V (w)+σU]
22and
U =( 1− λw)βU + λw
Z
max(V (w),βU)dF(w),
It is easy to show that the optimal job acceptance decision for this worker is characterized
by a reservation wage, which we denote by w∗. One can also show that decreases in λw or
increases in σ lead to decreases in the reservation wage. The dynamics of the employment
rate, et,i s
et+1 =( 1− σ)et + λw(1 − F(w∗))(1 − (1 − σ)et).
We focus on the steady state behavior of the unit mass of workers that each solve this
problem, and in particular will ask how changes in the two frictional parameters λw and σ
aﬀect steady state employment. For our numerical calculations we consider a period to be
a month, and set the values of β, λw,a n dσ to be the same as in our calibrated model.
An important consideration in comparing results across models is that one might expect the
shape of the distribution characterizing the uncertainty, in particular in the vicinity of the
reservation wage. With this in mind we we calibrate this model so that the cdf F(w) is the
same as the cdf for the stationary distribution of the idiosyncratic shock process from our
calibrated model. We then choose the value of b so that the steady state employment rate is
the same as in our calibrated model, i.e., equal to .632.9 These last two choices imply that
the distribution of wages is the same in the two settings, and that at least in an average
9We solve the model using value function iteration. We use a grid with 10000 points on w on the interval
[−2σw,2σw],w h e r eσw is the standard deviation of the distribution described by F(w), and applied Tauchen’s
(1986) method for the discrete approximation.
23sense, the marginal decision is in the same place in the distribution.10
5.2 Extension 2: Adding a Match Termination Decision
The second extension is in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Preferences are the
same as in extension 1. As in extension 1, we continue to assume that if a worker receives an
oﬀer, the wage is drawn from a distribution with cdf F(w). However, if the job is accepted,
it will evolve stochastically in future periods, according to an AR(1) process:
logwt+1 = ρlogwt + εt+1
where ε is an iid normally distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation
σε. The timing is as follows. For any worker who was employed in period t − 1,a tt h e
beginning of t − 1 they are subject to a separation probability that occurs with probability
σ. If a separation does not occur, a new draw for ε is realized, at which point the worker
decides whether to continue with the job. If not, they separate and are in the same position
as a worker who started the period not employed, or who experienced a separation shock.
Letting G(w0|w) denote the cdf for next period’s wage given this period’s wage is equal to w
implied by the stochastic process for wages on the job, the Bellman equations are




U =( 1− λw)βU + λw
Z
max(V (w),βU)dF(w).
10This cannot hold exactly, since employment decisions in our model are determined by both productivity
and assets.
24Our timing assumptions imply that an optimal search strategy for this individual will be
described by two reservation wages: one for which new oﬀers to accept, which we denote by
w∗
u and one for which jobs to separate from, which we denote by w∗
e.11
Denote the measure of employed workers over wages by Mt(w). Then the law of motion
for the employment rate in this model is described by:









The evolution of Mt(w) is described by:
Mt+1(w0)=λw(1 − et)max(F(w0) − F(w∗
u),0)











We calibrate this model in a similar fashion. In particular, we set β, λw,a n dσ as before.
We choose the parameters ρ and σε that describe the stochastic evolution of wages on the job
to be the same as those in our original calibration, and choose the cdf F(w) to correspond
to that of the stationary distribution of the stochastic process on wages. We then choose b
so that the steady state employment rate is equal to .632.12
11The reservation wage for accepting a new oﬀer is strictly below b in this model, since it provides some
option value on the new draw for next period, and the worker can always quit if the draw is not good. If
we assumed that a worker who leaves a job voluntarily cannot search during the same period then the two
reservation wages would be the same. We did not assume this in order to avoid asymmetic treatment of
voluntary and involuntary separations. In any case, this is not important for the results.
12Once again we solve the model using value function iteration. We use a grid with 300 values for w on
the interval [−2σw,2σw] and applied Tauchen’s (1986) method for the discrete approximation of F(w) and
G(w
0|w). The computation of the steady-state e is more involved–we iterated over the descretized measures
Mt(w) and et using their transition equations until they converged.
255.3 Results
We now consider the eﬀects of changes in frictions on steady state employment. Table 7
contains results for changes in λw.
Table 7
Eﬀect of λw on Steady State Employment
Our Model Extension 1 Extension 2 Pissarides
E/P E/P E/P E/P
λw =0 .66 3 .5% 66.5% 68.4% 70.8%
λw = .436 63.2% 63.2% 63.2% 63.2%
λw =0 .46 3 .0% 62.3% 61.7% 61.0%
λw =0 .26 1 .0% 54.5% 50.1% 43.2%
The ﬁrst column repeats the results for our model that also appeared in Table 3. The
next two columns reports results for the two extensions just described. The ﬁnal column
shows results for the benchmark Pissarides model used in the previous section, except that
we have now calibrated λw in this model so as to give a steady state employment rate of
.632.13
W eb e g i nb yc o m p a r i n gt h ee m p l o y m e n te ﬀects associated with a small decrease in λw,
f r o mt h eb e n c h m a r kv a l u eo f.436 to the value of .4.I no u rm o d e l ,t h ed r o pi ns t e a d ys t a t e
employment is .2, while the corresponding numbers for extension 1, extension 1, and the
Pissarides model are .9, 1.5 and 2.2. Two simple conclusions follow. First, both extensions
serve to signiﬁcantly dampen the steady state employment responses relative to the bench-
mark model. Extension 1, for example, has a response that is less than half as large. Second,
however, the extent of this dampening is still very much less than what occurs in our model.
13As we move from row to row we adjust the value of λw for this speciﬁcation proportionately. Moving from
the ﬁrst row to the fourth row the values of λw for the Pissarides model are .086, .063, .058,a n d.029.
26While Extension 1 yielded the smallest drop in steady state employment, but this drop is
still more than four times larger than the corresponding drop in our model.
While we will not discuss the other values in Table 7 in any detail, we note that this factor
four diﬀerence seems to apply equally well for large decreases in λw,a sw e l la sf o ri n c r e a s e s .
Table 8 repeats this exercise for changes in the separation rate σ.
Table 8
Eﬀect of σ on Steady State Employment
Our Model Extension 1 Extension 2 Pissarides
E/P E/P E/P E/P
σ =0 .02 63.7% 69.7% 69.4% 77.0%
σ =0 .039 63.2% 63.2% 63.2% 63.2%
σ =0 .04 63.2% 63.0% 62.8% 62.6%
σ =0 .06 62.6% 59.2% 57.7% 52.7%
The basic result is the same here as in Table 7. One again the two extensions do signiﬁ-
cantly dampen the responses relative to the benchmark Pissarides model. But these responses
are still more than ﬁve times as large as the responses in our model.
We conclude that our key result about the role of frictions in determining steady state
employment is robust to considering these extended versions of the benchmark Pissarides
model. That is, in an empirically reasonable model that includes both frictions and an oper-
ative labor supply margin consistent with the neoclassical theory of labor supply, labor supply
responses greatly attenuate the eﬀect of changes in frictions on steady state employment. Put
somewhat diﬀerently, the level of frictions does not seem to be a major determinant of steady
state employment.
276 Taxes and the Steady State
In this section we analyze what our model predicts regarding the labor market eﬀects of
increases in the size of the tax and transfer program.14 Prescott (2004) argued that diﬀerences
in the scale of tax and transfer programs could account for the bulk of the observed diﬀerences
in hours worked between the US and several European countries. His analysis assumed no
frictions and abstracted from the issue of how workers are distributed across labor market
states. In a steady state setting, these tax calculations are one of the sharpest examples of
how labor supply (i.e., choice) inﬂuences aggregate employment. It therefore is an interesting
calculation to revisit in our model that features both choice and chance.
We assess the importance of frictions for this exercise by comparing the results in our
benchmark calibrated economy with the results that emerge from the case in which λw is
set equal to 1, and the model is calibrated without targeting the unemployment rate. In
the results that we report below we consider a change in τ holding all other parameters
constant, including the two frictional parameters σ and λw. Models of the sort considered
by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) imply that the levels of these frictions will also respond
to changes in such things as tax rates. However, in view of the results from the previous
section, we know that from the perspective of the eﬀects on steady state employment, the
eﬀects associated with changes in frictions will be of second order.
14Krusell et al (2008) carry out this analysis in a model without idiosyncratic shocks. Krusell et al (2009)
show that such a model does not do a good job of accounting for worker ﬂows. Moreover, that paper did not
distinguish between unemployment and nonparticipation and so could not be used to assess the consequences
for these variables and statistics such as the duration of unemployment.
28Table 9 shows the results for the case of no frictions and our benchmark calibration. To
also show how the results are inﬂuenced by having even higher levels of frictions, we also
report results for the case of λw = .2.15
Table 9
Taxes and the Employment/Population Ratio
τ =0 .00 τ =0 .15 τ =0 .30 τ =0 .45
λw =1 .0 .880 .799 .632 .482
λw = .436 .854 .779 .632 .486
λw = .2 .829 .763 .632 .492
The striking result from this table is that the presence of frictions has virtually no eﬀect
on the impact of tax increases on employment. For the case of tax decreases, the presence
of frictions does have some eﬀect, but even when λw = .2 the eﬀect of frictions is relatively
small compared to the overall change. For example, when taxes are reduced to zero, the
employment rate increases by roughly 25 percentage points when there are no frictions, and
by roughly 22 percentage points when λw = .2. It follows that for evaluating the steady state
eﬀects of tax changes, the presence of reasonable frictions has little impact on the aggregate
response of employment.
Table 10 shows the implications of tax changes for the unemployment rate for the same
three cases considered in Table 9. Once again, we emphasize that we are holding the levels
of frictions constant in this experiment. If changes in taxes do lead to associated changes in
frictions, there would potentially be additional important eﬀects on unemployment.
15Once again, in this case all parameters of the model are recalibrated to match the same targets, but we
are not requiring that the model match the level of unemployment.
29Table 10
Taxes and the Unemployment Rate
τ =0 .00 τ =0 .15 τ =0 .30 τ =0 .45
λw =1 .0 .00 .00 .00 .00
λw = .436 .056 .065 .083 .096
λw =0 .2 .112 .125 .155 .179
An interesting result emerges. Given that the results with frictions are virtually identical
to results without frictions (especially for the case of tax increases), one might expect that
t h ec h a n g e si nt h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ew i l lb er e ﬂected mostly in changes in the participation
rate rather than the unemployment rate. But the table shows that changes in taxes do aﬀect
the measured unemployment rate in the models with frictions. In particular, when taxes are
increased from .30 to .45,a n dt h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ed r o p sf r o m.63 to .49, we see that the
unemployment rate increases from .08 to .10 and from .16 to .18 for the cases of λw = .436
and .20 respectively. Moreover, it is also the case the spell durations are also aﬀected, as
shown in Table 11.
Table 11
Spell Durations (E, U, N)a n dT a x e s
τ =0 .00 τ =0 .15 τ =0 .30 τ =0 .45
λw =1 .09 7 .5/0.0/13.33 6 .9/0.0/9.32 0 .8/0.0/12.11 6 .5/0.0/17.7
λw = .436 34.4/2.2/12.72 6 .8/2.2/11.71 8 .7/2.1/13.01 5 .3/2.1/17.8
λw =0 .23 8 .3/4.7/11.83 2 .8/4.5/12.72 4 .6/4.2/13.82 0 .3/4.0/19.1
Some interesting patterns emerge. Speciﬁcally, an increase in taxes leads to shorter
durations of employment and unemployment spells, and longer durations of nonparticipation.
The reason for the decrease in unemployment spell durations is that when taxes are high
individuals have a higher reservation productivity level for a given value of assets, and this
means that unemployed workers are more likely to experience a negative productivity shock
30and transition to out of the labor force.16
To summarize, the main ﬁnding of this section is that for reasonably calibrated frictions,
the aggregate employment eﬀects of the model with frictions is essentially identical to that
of the model without frictions. However, in the model with frictions, changes in taxes do
impact on statistics such as the unemployment rate and the duration of employment and
unemployment spells. In this sense the model with frictions has a richer set of predictions for
the eﬀect of tax changes than the model without frictions. Some researchers argue against the
importance of the labor supply channel emphasized in the frictionless model in some contexts
by suggesting that it is inconsistent with responses in the unemployment rate. This analysis
shows that such a general critique is not compelling in the context of a model with both a
nondegenerate labor supply decision and frictions. More generally, if changes in taxes were
accompanied by changes in the level of frictions, as implied by standard matching models,
then our model implies that one could generate diﬀerent changes in the unemployment rate
without having any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the employment eﬀects that we found.
7A C o n t r a s t i n g V i e w
The results of the last two sections suggest a very simple characterization of how our hybrid
model compares with the standard frictionless and frictional models used in the literature.
From the perspective of predicting changes in steady state employment, our hybrid model
behaves very closely to frictionless models. But from the perspective of making predictions
16It is important to note that we have not included an unemployment insurance system in our model, and
that in reality a more generous system may well inﬂuence the distribution of individuals between U and N.
31about changes in steady state unemployment, our model behaves very closely to the standard
frictional models. The striking and important ﬁnding is that the one-to-one inverse mapping
between employment and unemployment that is implicit in standard frictional models does
not at all hold in terms of steady state outcomes in our model.
In this section we discuss one implicit assumption of our speciﬁcation that is of particular
relevance in producing these ﬁndings. In particular, by assuming an AR(1) process for
the idiosyncratic shock process with normal innovations we have implicitly assumed that
the invariant distribution describing the idiosyncratic productivities is continuous. As an
extreme but simple alternative, we could have speciﬁed the idiosyncratic shock process so
that it has support on only two points, one of which corresponds to zero productivity and
the other which has some positive level of productivity. In this setting individuals will never
want to work if they have zero productivity. There is one further assumption of interest: the
probability of the high productivity state could be suﬃciently low that individuals always
want to work if they have high productivity, or it could be suﬃciently high that individuals
do not necessarily always want to work when productivity is high. If one were to adopt
the former speciﬁcation, then the model ceases to have an operative labor supply margin.
And not surprisingly, this model will not have any of the labor supply eﬀects that we have
emphasized earlier. It would follow that taxes have very little eﬀect on employment and that
frictions have large eﬀects on employment.17 In contrast, if one adopts the latter speciﬁcation
17These results hold for changes that are not too large. If taxes increase suﬃciently, for example, then
individuals might not want to work all of the time even in the high productivity state.
32then the model will behave very much like a model in which all workers are identical, and the
labor supply responses will be even somewhat more powerful than in our earlier analysis.18
An important issue is whether our criterion of asking the model to match observed labor
market ﬂows documented in Table 2 allows us to distinguish between these two diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. The answer is basically no, though there are some subtle issues. In particular,
one can specify the two-state Markov model so as to generate each of the above properties and
still have the resulting ﬂows be similar to those that we found for our benchmark calibration.
In particular, it can do an equally good job in matching the E to E, N to N, U to E, E
to N and N to E ﬂows as our benchmark calibration. The one subtle issue has to do with
matching the U to N ﬂow. As was also the case for our benchmark speciﬁcation, this two
state model cannot match the U to N ﬂow from the data. However, the extent of mismatch
is in some sense worse in the two state speciﬁcation. If individuals always want to work
when in the productive state, then the E to N ﬂow is identical to the U to N ﬂow. In our
benchmark model the U to N ﬂow does not match its value in the data, but at the same
time the U to N ﬂow is still roughly twice as large as the E to N ﬂow. For the case in which
individuals do not always want to work in the high productivity state, then the ﬂow from E
to N is necessarily larger than the ﬂow from U to N, making the issue even more severe.
We conclude from this that our results are not robust to very diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
18In our benchmark model, an individual who suﬀers an involuntary spell of nonemployment during a high
productivity period can only make up for the lost income by working in the future in some less productive
states. The lower productivity of these states reduces somewhat the ability of the individual to substitute
between voluntary and involuntary nonemployment spells.
33the innovations to the shock process, in the sense that there are speciﬁcations that could
match the ﬂows reasonably well and give very diﬀerent implications for the eﬀects of changes
in frictions and changes in taxes. One reason for not considering the two state speciﬁcation
in which individuals always work in the good state is that this speciﬁcation has no operative
labor supply margin, and one of the motivations for the development of our hybrid model is
that one can easily see situations in which the labor supply decision is operative. What the
above result implies however, is that one cannot dismiss the model that does not feature an
operative labor supply margin purely on the basis of matching the labor market ﬂows.
However, we believe there is alternative evidence that one can bring to bear on the issue
which gives us reason to prefer the continuous distribution speciﬁcation over the (two-state)
discrete distribution case in which individuals always want to work if the productivity is high.
If the distribution has all of its mass on two points and optimal behavior dictates wanting
to always work whenever the idiosyncratic productivity is high, there is no scope for any
aggregate changes to inﬂuence participation except via the idiosyncratic shock process. Such
as p e c i ﬁcation seems hard to square with the fact that participation rates vary signiﬁcantly
across countries, and that participation rates have changed smoothly for various groups in
the US over time, and often in diﬀerent directions. These observations suggest to us that it is
preferable to adopt a speciﬁcation in which at each point in time there are some individuals
for whom the participation decision has a continuous component that is aﬀected at the margin
by aggregate changes.
34Perhaps a more interesting case would be one in which the idiosyncratic shocks allow for a
positive mass at the zero productivity state. This would reﬂect the possibility that for many
individuals their idiosyncratic shocks are such that working is not a possibility. This might
be relevant in thinking about certain types of health shocks, for example. An examination
of Figure 1 suggests that our results are likely to be quite robust to introducing this feature.
Figure 1 shows that in our benchmark speciﬁcation there is no work done by those in roughly
the bottom decile of the productivity distribution. Even in the case of a dramatic increase in
frictions (from the benchmark value of .436 to the value of .2, resulting in an increase in the
unemployment rate of roughly 19 percentage points), there is still virtually no work being
done by those in the bottom decile of the distribution. It follows that adding even a sizeable
mass point at the bottom of the distribution wo u l dn o th a v ea n yi m p a c to nt h ee x t e n tt o
which labor supply responses are able to compensate for increases in frictions.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We use an empirically reasonable three state model of the labor market to address two
questions regarding the determination of steady state employment and unemployment at the
aggregate level. The ﬁrst concerns the eﬀect of changes in frictions on aggregate employment.
We ﬁnd that changes in either the job loss rate of the job ﬁnding rate do not have large
eﬀects on aggregate employment, though they do have sizable eﬀects on unemployment. In
particular, the labor supply response present in our model greatly attenuates the employment
response relative to the simplest matching model as well as common extensions. We conclude
35that choice plays a much larger role than chance in the determination of aggregate steady state
employment. In contrast, chance plays a dominant role in the determination of aggregate
steady state unemployment. The second issue is the eﬀect of tax and transfer programs on
aggregate employment. We ﬁnd that the presence of frictions has virtually no impact on
the response of aggregate employment, but the model also predicts that higher taxes lead to
higher unemployment and lower participation.
A key message for quantitative analysis of steady state labor market outcomes is that
including an operative extensive labor supply margin consistent with neoclassical models of
labor supply is important. Although frictions by themselves can exert a large direct eﬀect
on steady state employment, these eﬀects are largely oﬀset by labor supply responses.
While our analysis in this paper has focused solely on the determination of steady state
labor market outcomes, it is obviously of interest to examine how the forces of choice and
chance interact in contexts where transition dynamics are critical, such as when the economy
is subjected to shocks. In particular, what are the responses of employment and unemploy-
ment when there are shocks to the level of frictions, either to the oﬀer arrival rate or the
separation rate? How does the presence of a labor supply channel aﬀect the propagation
of these shocks? While the framework that we have used in this paper is well suited to
the analysis of this question, we think it is important to emphasize that there is no reason
to conjecture that our results about the dampening eﬀect of labor supply on the eﬀects of
frictions will continue to hold in the case of shocks to frictions.
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